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Introduction
In this paper we present results from four randomized social experiments involving early and intensive active labour market policies. The participants in the experiments were newly unemployed unemployment insurance (UI) bene…t recipients in Denmark in 2008.
The experimental treatments consisted of dramatic increases in the frequency of early counseling and monitoring, and of early mandatory active labour market programmes (ALMPs) . The experiments shed light on the nature of active labour market policy impacts, and in particular on their di¤erential e¤ects on men and women, but we also investigate di¤erential e¤ects between young workers and older workers, across di¤erent cyclical conditions, and impacts on unemployment and job durations.
In 2005, the …rst Danish randomized labour market policy experiment was conducted 1 , Quickly Back to Work (QBW1, hereafter), see Graversen & van Ours (2008a & 2008b , Rosholm (2008) , and Vikström et al. (2011) . It involved a dramatic intensi…cation of active labour market policies in the sense of providing newly unemployed workers with a sequence of treatments at a very early stage of unemployment. This experiment involved a number of active labour market policy instruments, i.e. job search training courses, frequent meetings with caseworkers, and early mandatory activation. The results were overwhelming: those who were randomized into the treatment group experienced a 3 week reduction in unemployment duration compared to those in the control group, and a cost-bene…t analysis conducted by the Danish Economic Council (2007) demonstrated large net gains. However, there was uncertainty concerning the actual source of the success; was it the combined package of treatments, or were certain elements of the package crucial? Could even better results be obtained by focusing on single elements of the package, or could similar e¤ects be obtained at lower costs? To shed light on these questions, a new set of four randomized experiments were designed, Quickly Back to Work 2 (QBW2, henceforth). These experiments were designed in such a way that they would yield estimates of the e¤ects of single elements of the QBW1 package. The treatments consist of weekly group meetings between a group of unemployed workers and 1-2 caseworkers (A), bi-weekly individual meetings between one unemployed worker and one caseworker (B), early programme participation (C), and a combination of group meetings and early programme participation (D). The randomized experiments, which are often referred to as a gold standard within the literature (see e.g. Kluve, 2010) , create an ideal setting for trying to resolve the issue of the most e¤ective treatment design. Essential problems such as selection into treatment and uncertainty about the contents of treatment can be avoided or are at least less problematic when using a carefully designed randomized experiment.
Active labour market policies are a pivotal element in the so-called Flexicurity model for the labour market, which the EU commission recommends to its member states, referring to Denmark as a model case (European Commission, 2007 ). The Flexicurity model consists of three components; 1) ‡exible hiring and …ring rules and regulations (that is, low levels of employment protection legislation), similar in spirit to those in Anglo-Saxon countries, 2) a generous and universal unemployment insurance and social assistance system, similar to that in other Scandinavian welfare economies, and 3) a very active labour market policy ensuring the availability and the quali…cation level of the workforce. In the 1980s, when unemployment rates were persistently high, the …rst two features of the Flexicurity model - ‡exibility in the labour market and a tight social safety net -were already present in the Danish labour market, but active labour market policies were only in their infant stages and not nearly as intensive as they have become today. In the 1990s the equilibrium unemployment rate fell simultaneously with a gradual intensi…cation of the use of active labour market policy measures, and therefore, many observers have seen intensive active labour market policies as the crucial component in the Flexicurity model (see e.g. Andersen & Svarer, 2007) . Our paper sheds further light on the validity of such an assessment.
As an aside, QBW1 and QBW2 mark an interesting paradigmatic change in the way policy makers approach active labour market policy making in Denmark: While it has not yet been fully implemented, it is the stated intention that policy changes should now be preceded by the collection of empirical evidence on its likely impact. For example, since the QBW2 experiment in 2008, further 8 sets of experiments have been or are being conducted, intended to foster further re…nement in the use of active labour market policies in Denmark.
We …nd large positive e¤ects of some of the policy components investigated, and there are enlightening di¤erences, especially with respect to the type of policy, the gender of the unemployed worker, the age of the participants, and the cyclical conditions. Counseling in the form of individual meetings between caseworkers and unemployed workers has very large e¤ects, arising much later for men than for women, while mandatory ALMPs have a 3 large (threat-) e¤ect for men, while there is a small negative e¤ect for women. Moreover, the threat e¤ect is only present when labour market conditions are good -we show this point by exploiting that the experiment was conducted right during the tipping point of the business cycle in 2008. Hence, di¤erences in the week of enrollment into the experiment (week of in ‡ow) re ‡ect di¤erent cyclical conditions. The analysis demonstrates that early and frequent meetings with unemployed workers are the most e¢ cient way of assisting newly unemployed workers. According to e.g. Card et al. (2010) , an often neglected aspect of policy evaluation is a consideration of programme costs against its prospective gains. We conduct a cost-bene…t analysis and …nd that individual meetings are also the most bene…cial instrument from an economic point of view.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: …rst, we provide an overview of the literature on active labour market policy e¤ects with a special emphasis on the e¤ects of meetings between caseworkers and clients, as there already exist several surveys and summaries of the impacts of activation programmes. In section 3 we describe the social experiments, and the data used for the analysis is presented along with some descriptives of the actual treatments administered. Section 4 contains a presentation of our main results and we also discuss the presence of heterogeneous e¤ects with respect to the business cycle and age. In section 5 we present results from a two-state duration model of employment and unemployment in order to investigate the dynamic nature of the treatment e¤ects.
In section 6 we perform a cost-bene…t analysis of each experiment. Finally, section 7 contains a discussion of further research, policy implications, and a conclusion.
A review of related literature
There is an extensive literature on the impacts of 'traditional'activation programmes, Kluve (2010) . Policy impacts are typically modest and not always positive. 2 The best e¤ects are found for employment subsidies, while training programmes sometimes have positive e¤ects when aimed at disadvantaged workers. Public job creation shows more negative than positive e¤ects, possibly due to so-called lock-in e¤ects.
One important aspect of activation policies is the presence of ex ante e¤ects. For 2 For example, Card et al. (2010) …nd that, in the short term, only 39% of the surveyed studies found signi…cantly positive e¤ects. In the medium term, e¤ects were slightly better, with 50% being signi…cantly positive.
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instance three observational studies based on Danish data and one on German data show that unemployed workers tend to leave unemployment faster when the probability of activation increases (Geerdsen, 2006; Geerdsen & Holm, 2007; Rosholm & Svarer, 2008;  van den Berg et al., 2009). Hence, ex ante e¤ects may change our conclusion on the overall e¤ectiveness of active policies towards a more positive view.
Another element of active labour market policies is that of meetings between caseworkers and the unemployed. As three of the four experiments in our study have an explicit focus on meetings, we provide a survey of studies that deal with the e¤ects of meetings held between caseworkers and the unemployed.
Meetings are a cornerstone of active labour market policies: First, unemployed workers typically register their entry into unemployment at meetings, where also their eligibility for receiving e.g. UI bene…ts is assessed. Second, search e¤ort is monitored at meetings, e.g. in the form of required documentation of job applications. Often, the caseworker has to assess whether the unemployed person is available for work. If there is non-compliance in the form of no-show, insu¢ cient search or availability, a sanction may be issued. Third, counseling takes place at meetings. Counseling can be help with the creation of a CV and writing applications, guidance in making career choices, general job search assistance etc. Fourthly, there may be direct referral to vacant jobs. Finally, future participation in ALMPs is discussed and planned at meetings.
Meeting attendance at certain regular intervals during unemployment periods is often mandatory, and no-show may lead to a sanction.
Thus, meetings have the potential of a¤ecting individual behaviour ex ante (fear of a sanction) as well ex post (search requirements, job search assistance, and potential behavioural e¤ects from perceived future activation). In the following, we brie ‡y review the evidence on ex ante e¤ects and ex post e¤ects.
Ex ante e¤ects of meetings
The literature on the ex ante e¤ects of meetings is rather new. Generally, we …nd that there are ex ante e¤ects, although this does not seem to be the case for long-term unemployed workers. Hägglund (2006) reports from a randomized experiment conducted in Sweden and shows that, for a broad group of unemployed workers, an invitation to a meeting, aimed at monitoring search activity and assisting with more e¤ective job search, led to an increase in the exit rate into employment by 46% already before the meeting took (or should have taken) place. Cockx & Dejemeppe (2007) analyze the e¤ect of a reform in Belgium in 2004 leading to more intensive monitoring of job search activities of workers with more than 7 months of unemployment. A letter was sent out to the unemployed informing them of this reform, and in general the authors …nd no impact. However, for better educated workers they do …nd signi…cantly positive ex ante e¤ects. Black et al. (2003) study a pro…ling tool aimed at identifying workers at risk of longterm unemployment (LTU). Workers with a high estimated LTU-risk were invited to a meeting with the aim of placement in an activation programme. The selection of whom to invite was randomized, and workers reacted to an invitation by increasing job …nding rates after receipt of the letter. Unemployment duration was shortened by 2.2 weeks, and the income of invited workers was higher than for the controls during the year after receipt of the letter.
Ex post e¤ects of meetings: counseling
Ex post e¤ects from counseling are generally positive, although there is a tendency that the group of long-term unemployed respond less favourably. Gorter & Kalb (1996) The authors construct a di¤erence-in-di¤erences estimator of the impact of the Gateway.
They …nd an increase in the employment rate of 5%-points 4 months after entry into the Gateway. counseling without altering the amount of monitoring. They found a tendency that programmes aimed at 'better'workers increased the exit rate from unemployment, and that all programmes increased subsequent employment duration.
Hägglund (2009) analyze a social experiment conducted in Sweden, where unemployed youth were o¤ered counseling. He found that, when aimed at all unemployed youth, there were positive e¤ects on the exit rate from unemployment, while this was not the case when the treatment was only aimed at long-term unemployed youth. This corresponds quite well with results from a randomized Danish study, Rosholm & Svarer (2009b) , where intensive counseling to long term welfare recipients did not lead to more employment. Meyer (1995) studies …ve U.S. experiments aimed at better counseling. Four of the …ve experiments led to signi…cant reductions in subsequent unemployment, ranging from 0.5 to 4.3 weeks. Dolton & O'Neill (1996; analyzed the ReStart program; In England, an o¤er of meetings every six months for workers with more than six months of unemployment was introduced in 1989. The aim was an e¤ectivisation of search behaviour (counseling part) and an assessment of the availability for work. A randomized experiment was conducted, and Dolton & O'Neill (1996) showed that this led to a 30% increase in exit rate from unemployment, and Dolton & O'Neill (2002) showed that …ve years after entry into the programme, the treatment group still had signi…cantly less unemployment than the controls.
Ex post e¤ects of meetings: Monitoring
Quite a few studies analyze the e¤ect of increasing the rate of monitoring of unemployed workers. They tend to …nd positive or zero e¤ects in the sense of reduced subsequent unemployment duration and/or increases in employment rates. 
Other aspects of meetings
Other aspects of meetings include ex post e¤ects from the match between a caseworker and an unemployed and also e¤ects from increasing the quality of the meetings. Finally it also includes e¤ects from actions taken by the caseworkers in relation to meetings, for instance job assignments and sanctions. Behncke et al. (2008 Behncke et al. ( , 2010a , and 2010b) investigate the importance of the caseworker, using a survey among Swiss caseworkers, which has subsequently been linked with a data set on their unemployed workers. They show that unemployed workers who have a caseworker with a strong network among employers have 3%-points higher employment rates subsequently, that unemployed workers assigned to caseworkers who are less 'cooperative' have 2%-points larger employment rates subsequently, and that if caseworkers and clients are similar with respect to age, gender, and educational level, then the unemployed worker has a 4%-point higher subsequent employment rate. This trilogy of studies therefore adds further insight into the importance of meetings via caseworker contacts; caseworkers provide contacts to potential employers; they put pressure on unemployed workers to search harder, and they can relate to their situation and provide useful insights on job search.
These …ndings therefore suggest ways for policy makers to improve ex post e¤ects of meetings. French data. Assignments reduce the search e¤ort of unemployed workers, but the assignments themselves more than outweigh this reduction, such that job …nding is faster with job assignments. They …nd particularly strong e¤ects for the unskilled. Engström 
Equilibrium e¤ects
Meetings may have important general equilibrium e¤ects, such as negative e¤ects on untreated individuals due to increased competition in the labour market from the treated individuals -this would imply that the control group performs worse than they would have done without the presence of treatment. Positive e¤ects could come from equilibrium responses from …rms who increase the number of vacancies due to the lower mean duration of a vacancy (if treated individuals search more -or better). However, the literature on this issue is rather small. Denmark, using the fact that it was only implemented in 2 out of 15 counties. They compare control group workers in the treatment region with workers in una¤ected regions using a di¤erence-in-di¤erence approach. They …nd some evidence that the job …nding rate of the control group workers declines due to the treatment. Furthermore, they construct and estimate a structural search model to determine the e¤ects of implementation of the treatment on a country wide basis and …nd that negative congestion e¤ects are present and lower the overall treatment e¤ect, which is however still positive and leads to lower equilibrium unemployment.
Our knowledge concerning the presence of general equilibrium e¤ects and their size with respect to meetings is thus still very limited.
Summary of literature review
Meeting e¤ects are remarkably large and consistent; of the 37 studies referred to above, 29-31 had signi…cantly favourable e¤ects, and only 6-8 had no e¤ects. None found signi…cantly unfavourable e¤ects on employment outcomes. There are ex ante e¤ects of meetings, counseling e¤ects, monitoring e¤ects, job assignment e¤ects, and there are important aspects of the caseworkers that could be exploited, and …nally, sanctions -which are a result of contacts between caseworkers and unemployed workers -have dramatic e¤ects on job …nding rates.
The Danish labour market and the experiments
This section presents the experimental design and puts it into the context of the Danish labour market. First we will brie ‡y describe the organization of the Danish labour market with a particular focus on active labour market policy.
The Danish labour market is characterized as ‡exible with less employment protection legislation than most continental European countries and much more labour turnover (see e.g. OECD, 2009). The Danish labour market has a tight social security net with nearuniversal eligibility for income transfers. Moreover, active labour market policies are among the most intensive in OECD, with around 1.5% of GDP spent per year on active policies.
There are two types of bene…ts for unemployed workers, UI bene…ts and social assistance. Approximately 80% of the labour force are members of a UI fund and therefore eligible for UI bene…ts, while the remaining 20% may receive social assistance (given that they do not have a partner who can provide for them and do not have any savings).
UI bene…ts are essentially a ‡at rate. As this paper is only concerned with UI bene…t recipients, we shall present the policies that apply to them.
The mutual "rights and obligations" principle is a key principle in the current Danish labour market policy. This implies the right of individuals to compensation for the loss of income, but also the obligation to take action to get back into employment. The authorities have an obligation to help the individual improve her situation and has the right to make requirements of the individual concerned.
Under the current rules, an individual who becomes unemployed and is eligible for UI bene…ts has to register at the local jobcentre. She then has the obligation to attend a meeting with a caseworker at least every 3 rd month. She has the right and obligation to participate in an activation programme after 9 months (6 if below 30 years old) of unemployment and subsequently every 26 weeks. These are the labour market policies that will be faced by individuals in the control groups of the four experiments, who will receive this 'treatment as usual'.
The experiments
The set of randomized experiments analyzed in this paper consists of four separate experiments, each with its own treatment and control group. They were conducted in four di¤erent regions in Denmark. They are summarized in Table 1 . Gribskov, Roskilde,
Ishøj-Vallensbaek
Holbaek, Vordingborg The individuals randomized into the treatment groups then receive a letter, during the …rst week of unemployment, explaining the new treatment to which they will be exposed. 3 This information letter marks the start of the treatment, since the worker may react to the information on the new regime from the day the letter is read. It was not possible to escape treatment by leaving unemployment for a short while and then re-enter later on.
In that case, a worker would re-enter the experimental treatment at the stage where she left it.
In all four experiments, the control group receives 'treatment-as-usual' (tau) as explained above. There may be local variations in the intensity of the tau, which will be documented below. Starting from the bottom of Table 1 , the experiment labeled 'D'is a sort of reference experiment -partially intended to mimic the QBW1 experiment from 2005-6, although there are some important deviations. Contrary to QBW1, the meetings are group meetings and there is no two-week JSA course included in the treatment as in QBW1. Hence, this 'reference experiment'consists of less intensive interaction between caseworkers and the unemployed than was the case in QBW1. The experiment was conducted in the region of Southern Denmark (consisting of Funen and the southernmost part of Jutland). During the …rst 13 weeks of unemployment the unemployed worker must attend group meetings with a caseworker and a number of other unemployed workers (typically around 10). If, after 13 weeks of open unemployment, she has not found employment, she has to participate in an ALMP of at least 25 hours per week for at least 13 weeks. After 6 months of unemployment, the experimental treatment ends, and from that point on, she receives tau, that is, the rules regarding her treatment-trajectory from this point onwards is similar to that of the control group.
The experiment labeled 'A'in Table 1 was conducted in the region of Northern Jutland, and it consisted of weekly group meetings (similar to those in Southern Denmark) during the …rst 13 weeks of unemployment. After these 13 weeks, the experimental treatment ends, and the unemployed worker would then receive tau. The idea with this experiment was to investigate if group meetings would produce as positive e¤ects as individual meetings (at a lower cost).
The experiment labeled 'B'in Table 1 The aim of the entire set of experiments was to try to disentangle the positive impacts of the QBW1 experiment, and to investigate cost-reducing policies such as group meetings rather than individual meetings. First, the distinction between 'B' and 'C' informs us whether an early programme e¤ect stems mainly from the threat of mandatory program participation (a threat e¤ect) or from an e¤ect generated by meetings, or both. Second, a comparison between 'A' and 'B' would shed light on whether group meetings could achieve the same impacts as individual meetings. Finally, the comparison of 'A'and 'D' would tell us if the combination including group meetings would achieve better e¤ects than just group meetings, and the comparison of 'D'to 'C'would tell us if a sequence of group meetings followed by an early and intensive activation programme would lead to better e¤ects than just ALMP participation.
Comparisons such as the ones mentioned above rely on an assumption of comparable labour markets between the di¤erent regions. Denmark is the OECD country with the smallest regional disparity in terms of GDP per worker. Furthermore, the regions have roughly the same GDP pr. capita (Danish Business Authority, 2009), and all regions contain large cities (by Danish standards). From an international point of view these di¤erences appear small, and therefore we believe that comparisons across experiments in terms of average treatment e¤ects are valid. 5 The Mid-Jutland region (Experiment C) is di¤erent from the other regions in some respects; the fraction of young individuals is higher. This implies that the fraction of married individuals is lower and it also explains the higher degree of income transfer receipt (which includes study grants). Furthermore, the region of Copenhagen & Sealand (Experiment B) has a larger pool of immigrants in their pool of insured unemployed, re ‡ecting the fact that Copenhagen is the capital of Denmark -and the port of entry for most immigrants -and therefore a larger fraction of immigrants live there. Finally, Figure 1 shows the estimated Kaplan-Meier survival estimates from the …rst unemployment spell for the four control groups. These estimates are very similar and therefore support the validity of comparisons between regions keeping the di¤erences mentioned above in mind. 6 5 In the appendix we have tabulated descriptive statistics for all four control and treatment groups, and we have performed simple proportion tests to determine whether there are signi…cant deviations (not reported) 6 Various rank tests do not reject the null hypothesis of equality of survivor functions. 
Data
The data are extracted from administrative registers merged by the National Labour Market Authority into an event history data set, which records and governs the payments of public income transfers, records participation in ALMPs, and has information on periods of employment. The administrative data are used for determining eligibility for UI bene…t receipt and for determining whether the jobcentres meet their requirements in terms of meetings and activation intensities. The information is therefore considered highly reliable. Table 2 . We have tabulated the averages of selected individual characteristics for each of the sub-samples in the appendix. We …nd no signi…cant deviations from random assignment.
We have weekly information on labour market status, meeting attendance, and programme participation for each person in the experiment. Each person is followed until the end of August, 2010. Labour market status is calculated based on information from the register on payments of public income transfers, which is used to construct the labour market states 'unemployment'and 'other public income transfers'. Data will also tell us whether individuals are employed or not using information from the E-income register, containing information from employers about their employed workers. Finally, there is a residual labour market category, called 'self-su¢ cient', consisting of the self-employed and individuals that are neither working nor receiving any income transfers (e.g. housewives).
Given the sampling window (week 8-29 in 2008), all individuals can be followed for at least 111 weeks (there are 53 weeks in 2009) and for at most 132 weeks after their entry into unemployment. We can also follow individuals back in time, although the employment information is available only from 2008 and onwards.
Implementation
In this subsection, we present evidence on the implementation of the four experiments.
To show the degree of compliance to the experimental protocol, we show a set of …gures on the weekly meeting intensities and activation intensities. We have also tabulated these intensities on gender and we have found no remarkable di¤erences in this dimension. Note: Meeting intensities for those who are still unemployed in a given week. Figure 2 plots the weekly meeting intensity in the 3 regions for the treatment and control group. In Experiments A and D the treatment group were intended to participate in group meetings on a weekly basis. In both projects, we see that only around 60% of the those in the treatment group who were still unemployed in a given week participated in meetings in any of the …rst 13 weeks. In Experiment B, we observe a saw-tooth pattern re ‡ecting the fortnightly meetings. Summing the meeting intensities for two consecutive weeks, the fortnightly meeting intensity begins around 90% and then falls to about 65% around week 13. In Experiment C there was no intention of extra meetings, and this is also what we observe in the data. Hence, even though participation in meetings does not comply completely to the requirements of the experiment, the treatment groups in the three relevant projects attended signi…cantly more meetings than did the corresponding control groups during the early phases of the unemployment spell. The meeting rate for the treatment and the control groups is the same after the period of the experimental treatment in all regions. Notice, however, that the sequence of intensive meetings con-tinues a few weeks beyond week 13 of the unemployment spell. We interpret this as an implementation lag in the treatment process, as well as a consequence of meetings cancelled earlier in the unemployment spell due to sickness, job search, etc. Note: Activation intensities for those who are still unemployed in a given week. Figure 3 shows weekly activation intensities. In the two projects with scheduled early activation (C and D), we see a sharp increase in the activation intensity around week 13.
Again, not everyone in the treatment groups was activated between week 13 and 26, but the activation intensity is much higher for the treatment group than for the control group, especially in Experiment C. In Experiment D, which was conducted in two jobcentres in Southern Denmark, it turns out that one of the jobcentres did not implement early activation at all. That is, for the treatment group in that jobcentre, the treatment was the same as for the treatment group in Experiment A.
Further analysis of the type of activation to which the unemployed in the treatment groups were assigned reveals that the unemployed are assigned to programmes with the intention to upgrade and clarify their skills (i.e. educational and training programmes).
These are typically programmes with a duration of around 4 weeks. This category of programmes is the most commonly used activation instrument in Denmark (see e.g. Danish Economic Council, 2007) .
In all regions we observe an increase over time in the activation intensity for those who remain unemployed in the control groups. This follows naturally from the large focus on active labour market policy in the Danish ‡exicurity model (see e.g. Andersen & Svarer, 2007) . After the end of the experimental treatment period (at week 26), the activation intensities for treatment and control groups converge rather quickly. In Experiment B a marginally larger fraction of the remaining unemployed in the treatment group is activated compared to the control group, possibly re ‡ecting outcomes from the meetings with caseworkers (or dynamic selection out of the group). It is, however, only a small deviation.
All in all, the meetings and activation intensity …gures reveal that the treatment groups to a large extent received the intended treatments (with the exception of one jobcentre in Southern Denmark), and they were at any rate treated much more intensively than the control groups in the relevant dimensions 7 .
Finally, we consider the treatment of the control groups between di¤erent regions to analyze whether their treatment in some regions was given lower than normal priority due to the intensi…ed treatment requirement for the treatment groups. This could for instance be due to lack of economic ressources (a substitution e¤ect). Note that, in order to avoid such e¤ects, extra ressources were given to the jobcentres in compensation for the intensi…ed treatment requirement. Using the fact that the timing and content of the treatment varies between regions we analyze the presense of such e¤ects. Therefore we compare the meeting and activation intensities between the di¤erent regions over time to determine whether there are systematic di¤erences in the treatment of the control groups in di¤erent regions. The …gure is reported in the appendix, and although there is local variation, we do not …nd any systematic di¤erences between the regions. 8 
Main results
In this section we present the e¤ects of each of the four experiments. The outcome we study is the accumulated number of weeks employed from the start of the experiment until week t, and then we let t vary form 1 to 111 weeks. The e¤ect of treatment in a given week ( ) is estimated in the following regression:
where W it is the number of weeks in employment t weeks after enrollment into the experiment, T it denotes treatment status and H it is a measure of earlier employment history 9 . H it is included in order to remove some of the 'between-individuals'variation in accumulated weeks in employment. This decreases the minimum detectable e¤ect size by decreasing the residual variation in the sample. A minimum detectable e¤ect denotes the smallest true treatment e¤ect given a speci…ed level of statistical power, signi…cance and given a speci…c statistical test (for more on this see eg. Bloom, 2006) .
The overall patterns of e¤ects are not changed by inclusion of the history variables, which also was not expected, as the variation accounted for by labour market history is independent of treatment status, due to the randomisation design. The main statistical …ndings below remain signi…cant when we exclude the history variable from the regression.
The treatment e¤ect at time t, t , measures the average number of extra weeks spent employed for the treatment group compared to the control group from the beginning of the experiment until t weeks later. We also report the relevant bound of the con…dence interval of the e¤ects both at a 5% and 10% level (the one corresponding to a one-sided test, where the hypothesis is either that the e¤ect is above or below 0 depending on the sign of the actual e¤ect). These are obtained by bootstrapping, where each individual in a given bootstrap sample is followed for all 111 weeks. 10 E¤ects are reported separately for men and women. For each experiment we also calculate the di¤erence in weeks of employment for men and women with con…dence bands, in two experiments (B & C) we …nd signi…cant di¤erences, and these will be commented on below. 9 H it measures the number of weeks the individual was employed in the timespan from 10 to 10 t weeks before enrolment into the experiment. 10 Adding additional explanatory variables in the regressions does not change neither the results nor the con…dence bounds noticeably. 20 Figure 4 shows the employment e¤ects of Experiment A, the group meetings. For women, there are negative employment e¤ects in the very short run, but already after 20 weeks the accumulated e¤ect becomes positive. 52 weeks after the beginning of unemployment, women in the treatment group have spent a week more employed than women in the control group, and after two years, the e¤ect is around 2 weeks. For men there is also a positive e¤ect of about 2 weeks two years after entry into the experiment, but this e¤ect materializes much later than for women. The fact that the e¤ect arises at such a late stage suggests that the primary channel through which group meetings a¤ect employment is via longer job duration rather than shorter unemployment duration, and this result appears to hold more strongly for men than for women. However, neither for men nor for women are the e¤ects signi…cantly di¤erent from 0, nor are the gender di¤erences statistically signi…cant. Figure 5 shows the e¤ects of the Experiment B, fortnightly individual meetings. Both women and men bene…t greatly from participating in individual meetings. Two years after entry into unemployment, the treatment group has accumulated an overall average of around 4-6 weeks more of employment than the control group. Considering that the total employment rate of the control group over the two-year period is slightly below 50%, this corresponds to more than a 10% increase in the employment rate over the two-year period after entry into the programme. This is a very large e¤ect and it is also statistically signi…cant at the 5% level for men and also for women (at least within the …rst year).
Experiment A: Group meetings

Experiment B: Individual meetings
As in Experiment A, observe that men respond much later than women to the treatment, suggesting that women …nd jobs faster, while men keep their jobs longer (this is analyzed in section 5). In the appendix we plot the di¤erence between males and females for each t: The accumulated number of weeks of employment for women is signi…cantly di¤erent from their male counterparts already from the …rst weeks of the experiment. This further illustrates that there are subtle di¤erences in terms of dynamic behaviour across gender.
Overall the results from this experiment con…rm the patterns found in the literature -that there are positive e¤ects of intensi…ed counseling for the unemployed. This holds even in the Danish case of already fairly intensive counseling. Compared to the e¤ects of the group meetings in Experiment A, the e¤ect is much larger when individual meetings are used. Naturally, the costs of having individual meetings are larger. In the cost-bene…t analysis later in this paper, we show that the extra costs of having individual meetings are strongly dominated by the positive e¤ects on accumulated employment. Figure 6 shows the e¤ect of intended early activation (after 13 weeks of unemployment). The di¤erence between women and men is remarkable. In the appendix we provide the gender di¤erence for each t with con…dence bands, and, as in experiment B, it is clear that there are statistically signi…cant di¤erences across gender. From Figure 6 it appears that women do not react at all to the anticipated activation, and if anything their accumulated employment is reduced (albeit not signi…cantly), presumably due to lock-in e¤ects combined with very low post-programme e¤ects. For men, the e¤ect starts accumulating already after 9 weeks of unemployment, suggesting that at least a part of the observed e¤ect is an ex ante e¤ect, when compared to Figure 3 , which shows that the activation intensity does not start to increase before weeks 13 to 17.
Experiment C: Early activation
One might then have expected to observe higher transition rates back into unemployment, such that an initial positive e¤ect would tend to decline or at least not increase further over time. We …nd the opposite, suggesting that threat e¤ects not only scare male workers out of unemployment but keep them from returning -and the e¤ect is statistically signi…cant. The …nding that men react to the threat of activation, but women do not, is consistent with the results by Rosholm & Svarer (2008) and Geerdsen & Holm (2007) .
Comparing these results to the …nding from QBW1, it seems that the positive e¤ect for women may be driven by the individual meetings, whereas for men we see both an e¤ect from the threat of mandatory programme participation (a threat e¤ect) and an e¤ect generated by meetings. Figure 7 shows the e¤ect of combining group meetings with early activation. We observe a positive and signi…cant e¤ect for women initially, but compared to the case in Experiment A it appears that when we combine meetings with early activation, the e¤ect stops accumulating after less than a year. After two years there is no di¤erence in accumulated employment between the treatment and the control groups. For men the e¤ect is close to zero the …rst year, whereafter the di¤erence between employment in the two groups favours the control group, although not signi…cantly so. This …nding illustrates the importance of evaluating ALMPs over time as conclusions might change due to the dynamics of subsequent employment and unemployment spells. 11 As mentioned earlier, the treatment group in one of the two jobcentres in Southern Denmark did not receive early activation, and in fact, there is some anecdotal evidence that they did not receive any extra attention at all due to personnel problems in the 11 Card et al. (2010) show in their survey that programme evaluations with a longer time horizon are more likely to …nd positive impacts. 24 jobcentre. In Figure 8 we therefore show the results from the jobcentre that did follow the guidelines of the experiment. The results from the compliant jobcentre are more positive. The e¤ect for women is strictly positive, and for men it is zero. It is interesting that, whereas there was a positive e¤ect for men of early activation in isolation, this is no longer the case when combined with group meetings. This might suggest that knowledge of future 'fellow activation buddies' tends to reduce the threat e¤ect.
Experiment D: Group meetings and early activation
As a robustness check of our …ndings above, we have also performed the same analysis where we construct one control group from the 4 regions and compare this synthetic control group to the di¤erent treatment groups. The central …ndings still remain, there are e¤ects from treatment in the experiments involving individuals meetings (B) and early activation (C).
Heterogeneous treatment e¤ects
The analysis presented in the last section creates a strong case for the e¤ect of meetings for both women and men. The results also reveal intriguing di¤erences between men and women in terms of behavioural responses to the di¤erent treatments. To further analyze whether treatment e¤ects vary along di¤erent dimensions, we have also investigated the interaction between age and business cycle conditions and treatment e¤ects. This part is based on a simple linear regression of accumulated weeks of employment in week 111 on treatment status, age group or business cycle indicator, and their interactions. 12 The results are robust to other model speci…cations that account for probability mass in zero weeks of accumulated employment (e.g. the tobit model).
Related to age, our only statistically signi…cant …nding is that it is especially young men that react to (the threat of) early activation The result shows that young men accumulate 12 weeks more employment than their counterparts in the control group.
Related to business cycle conditions, we use the fact that the in ‡ow period of QBW2
gives an opportunity to relate the e¤ectiveness of the di¤erential treatments to the business cycle. Figure 9 graphs the out ‡ow rate of individuals entering unemployment from 2000 until 2009 conditional on a wide range of explanatory variables. 13 The …gure illustrates the large impact of the world …nancial crisis in Denmark. It illustrates that the crisis led to a collapse of out ‡ow rates from unemployment from the beginning of the 3rd quarter of 2008 and onwards. We have found that this time pattern present in all regions. This implies that individuals becoming unemployed in the last part of the in ‡ow period (week [16] [17] [18] [19] [20] [21] [22] [23] [24] [25] [26] [27] [28] [29] of the experiment will potentially experience worse labour market conditions, as they become unemployed very close to this decline in out ‡ow rates. Year and Quarter
Source: Own calculations based on an estimated duration model
Our results show signi…cant di¤erences in treatment e¤ects in the experiment with early activation. Here, men who become unemployed in the …rst part of the experiment, 12 To save space we do not include the results in the paper, but they are of course avaliable upon request. 13 This rate is determined by estimating a duration model including a wide range of explanatory variables and quarterly dummies.
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when labour market conditions were good, accumulate 12 weeks more employment than those becoming unemployed closer to the time when the Danish economy was hit by the …nancial crisis. This suggests that the threat e¤ect of having to attend early activation programmes is more prominent during favourable economic conditions. It is presumably easier to react to a threat of activation when there are plenty of jobs to choose from.
The dynamics of treatment
Below we provide additional insight into the dynamics of the treatment e¤ects by extending the analysis to a multi-state duration framework. We analyze the e¤ects of treatment on unemployment duration and subsequent employment duration. We include all spells of employment and unemployment experienced during the two-year period (111 weeks) following the experiment. 14 
Evaluation method
For each experiment, we have two random samples of the in ‡ow into unemployment, the treatment group and the control group; the distribution of any unobserved variables is independent of treatment status at the time of in ‡ow. However, already one week into the unemployment period, those in the treatment group will become aware of the experiment and this might alter their future behaviour and thereby violate the assumption of identical distributions. Therefore, we cannot just compare transition rates between the treatment and control groups as these will be biased estimates of the treatment e¤ects if this selection process on unobserved variables is not accounted for. The transition rates thereby capture both a treatment e¤ect and a selection e¤ect (for more on this issue see
Abbring & van den Berg, 2005).
We can illustrate this point in a single-spell single-state model. Denote the observed hazard rate at time t as (tjX; D) where X is the observed heterogeneity of individuals and D is an indicator for being assigned to the treatment group. Imagine that the information letter is sent at time 1 and that U represents an unobserved variable (say, motivation or ability). Due to randomization into treatment, U will be independent of treatment status 14 Treatment group assignment has no severe e¤ects on transition rates into other labour market states such as self-su¢ ciency or other public income transfers. If anything, time spent in such states is reduced.
These results are not reported but are available upon request.
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at the time of in ‡ow, implying that (tjX; D = 1) = (tjX; D = 0) for t = 0; 1. However, for t 2 this will not necessarily be the case, as the received information is likely to change the behaviour of those in the treatment group from their "normal behaviour" (the control group). The observed hazard rate for t 2 is equal to
which depends on the distribution of the unobserved variable conditional on survival until t. If treatment a¤ects behaviour, the distribution of this unobserved variable is likely to di¤er between the control and treatment groups for t 2. Hence, (tjX; D) is likely to di¤er both due to a direct treatment e¤ect and due to a composition e¤ect for t 2.
Duration models allow us to account for this selection bias by explicitly modelling the selection process out of the state of interest.The cost of this is the imposition of distributional assumptions. Abstracting away from our single-state model, we also need to deal with spurious correlations arising from non-random selection into employment, when we extend the problem above to post-unemployment outcomes (employment duration). To do so, we allow for transition-speci…c unobserved terms to be correlated across states. Note that the random e¤ects assumption, needed in the mixed proportional hazard (MPH) model presented below, according to which treatment and unobserved explanatory variables are independent in the in ‡ow to unemployment, is satis…ed by construction due to the randomized assignment to treatment.
We use a non-parametric speci…cation for the unobserved heterogeneity distribution, and we do not impose a priori a …xed number of mass points in the distribution of the unobserved components. Instead we rely on the Akaike Information Criterion to decide the number of mass points. The baseline hazard is piecewise constant. We control for various explanatory variables and estimate the models separately for men and women, as the above analysis has shown very di¤erent behavioural patterns over time. The method of estimation is NPMLE (see e.g. Heckman & Singer, 1983) , and we treat individuals moving to other states than employment and unemployment as censored observations. The two hazard rates, from unemployment to employment and from employment to unemployment, are assumed to have a MPH form:
where j (t) is the baseline hazard for the transition j. Treatment causes a shift upward or downward in the hazard rates. We allow for time-varying treatment e¤ects; j ( ),
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where denotes time since entry into the experiment (for unemployment, = t, while for employment spells, is equal to the duration of unemployment plus the elapsed employment duration. The time-variation is chosen to capture the change in treatment intensity around week 16 (see the comments above on implementation lags). Formally, this means that we take j (t j X j ) = 1 j 1( 16) + 2 j 1( > 16). Table 3 reports the results from the estimation of the model speci…ed above. Explanatory variables, similar to those in section 4, are included in the estimations but not reported in the table to save space. The treatment e¤ects of Experiment A (group meetings) show no e¤ect on job …nding for men, and only a small insigni…cant e¤ect for women after 16 weeks of unemployment, which is consistent with the lack of an early impact, especially for men, in Figure 4 . It also explains the slight increase in the employment rate for women in the treatment group from around week 20. For men who …nd employment, the employment separation rate is signi…cantly lower in the treatment group, while for treated women, exit rates from employment back into unemployment are increased, albeit insigni…cantly. 15 The …ndings 15 Note that very few …nd a job and leave it again before week 16 after entry into the experiment. This explains the large standard errors on the treatment e¤ects on the hazard out of employment before week 16.
Estimation results, dynamic treatment e¤ects
30 thus explain quite well the observed pattern of accumulated e¤ects presented in Figure   4 ; for women, there is a slight increase in job …nding rates after some time, which might suggest a counselling or network e¤ect arising from more e¢ cient job search or access to new search channels. For men, the e¤ect arises entirely due to longer lasting employment spells. One way to interpret this result is that meetings/counseling improve the match between employers and employees for men. If this is the case, the e¤ects are likely to grow even further over time. The impact relative to the baseline hazard is a 27% decrease in the transition rate back into unemployment (exp( 0; 318) 1).
Similar …ndings for men follow from Experiment B (individual meetings); however, in contrast to Experiment A there is a small positive impact on job …nding (not signi…cant) and once again a signi…cant negative e¤ect on the transition rate from employment back into unemployment for individuals in the treatment group. When compared to the group meetings, the positive e¤ect on the transition rate out of unemployment is important, as the combined e¤ect leads to a much larger impact on accumulated employment than group meetings, cf. Figure 5 . For women there is an immediate e¤ect of meetings on the transition rate into employment (signi…cant at the 10% level), whereas this was not the case with the group meetings. The e¤ect on the transition rate from employment into unemployment is negative -albeit smaller and not signi…cant -than for men. The accumulated 5 week employment gain for men observed in Figure 5 comes mainly from more stable employment, whereas for women the 3.5 week e¤ect comes mainly from faster job …nding. In the …gure, this di¤erence manifested itself in the say that the accumulated gain from treatment for men set in at a much later stage than for women.
For Experiment C (early activation) we see a much higher (but still not signi…cant) e¤ect for men from treatment group assignment in the …rst 16 weeks when compared to the …rst two experiments. This is consistent with the fact that the timing of treatment in this experimental setup is di¤erent as there is almost no activation before week 16. This indicates ex ante e¤ects in the form of threat/motivation e¤ects from the anticipated future enrollment into an activation programme. We also observe a negative e¤ect on the transition rate out of subsequent employment, suggesting that the ex ante e¤ects do not imply less stable job relations as one might have expected using search theoretical arguments. However, none of these e¤ects are statistically signi…cant, in spite of the large (and signi…cant) accumulated e¤ects found in Figure 6 . We explain this by the fact that both of the mentioned e¤ects work in the same direction. In section 5.2, this presumed ex ante e¤ect was shown to arise mainly during the more favourable cyclical conditions.
If we introduce an interaction between our treatment group indicator and an indicator for becoming unemployed during good and bad economic conditions, the results show a signi…cant positive e¤ect during the good cyclical conditions (coe¢ cient 0:1773; std.err. 0:0896) and a small, insigni…cant, negative e¤ect during bad conditions.
Women respond remarkably di¤erent than men to early activation -there is no sign of ex ante e¤ects, instead we see a large, 20%, and signi…cantly negative e¤ect, on the transition rate out of unemployment from week 17 and onwards. This is presumably a standard locking-in e¤ect from participation in activation programmes. For women, there is no e¤ect on the transition rate from employment back into unemployment, which leads to an overall negative (insigni…cant) impact on accumulated employment in Figure 6 .
The results from Experiment D (early activation + group meetings) shows a slight negative e¤ect on job …nding for men, and that they tend to have a smaller exit rate from jobs, but this e¤ect is also insigni…cant and smaller than what is obtained in the other experiments. The results from the duration model does not support the …ndings in Figure 7 that showed a negative e¤ect for men. The missing link is that the transition rate to other types of public income transfers was higher for the treatment group, and this seems to drive the lower employment rate. For women we see a positive e¤ect on the transition rate out of unemployment in the …rst 16 weeks, which is similar to what we had in the case of individual meetings. In relation to Figure 7 , the initial positive e¤ect on transitions into employment is, however, counteracted by a higher transition rate back into unemployment for employed individuals in the treatment group. Notice that comparing transition rates between Experiments C and D, there was a positive e¤ect for men of early activation in isolation, which is no longer found when combined with group meetings.
Finally, we compare the above …ndings with those reported in relation to the QBW1 experiment in Rosholm (2008) , Graversen & van Ours (2008a & 2008b and Blasco & Rosholm (2011) . The …rst two studies …nd that on average individuals in the treatment group leave unemployment around 20% faster than individuals in the control group. This is an e¤ect of about the same size as what we have reported for women exposed to meetings and for men exposed to the threat of early activation. For men, we …nd an additional favourable e¤ect in Experiments A-C on their subsequent employment spell. This is also the …nding in Blasco & Rosholm (2011) . They include subsequent employment spells and …nd that overall the experiment reduces unemployment reoccurrence for men, but not for women. Hence, the results found here are in accordance to what was found in QBW1 and may hence help to explain the …ndings there is a combined e¤ect of frequent individual meetings and the threat of future activation.
We are not able to explain why women …nd jobs faster and men tend to keep them longer when exposed to meetings, and why men react to perceived future activation by searching more and …nding better jobs, while women do not. Some of it may be due to di¤erent search focus -women tend to …nd employment in the public sector and men in the private sector. Furthermore, caseworkers are mostly female and often have experiences from other jobs in the public sector, which may enable them to help women better. Public jobs typically last for a long time, which might explain why there is no impact on exit from jobs for women. It might also just be the case that predominantly female caseworkers are better able to help female job searchers, as suggested by Behncke et al. (2010b) .
Finally, psychological and behavioural reactions might di¤er between men and women;
for example, women may listen more to the advice of the caseworkers, while men are more self-con…dent and perhaps therefore less inclined to take advice. 16 The presence of threat e¤ects for men has been documented in a number of studies, and it could have the same explanation; the self-con…dence of men leads them to believe that they know better and that no activation programme will be able to improve on their skills, while women may in fact look forward to perceived skill improvements. However, this is all speculation, and data on behavioural aspects would be necessary to shed light on this issue. In fact, the National Labour Market Authority of Denmark has recently decided to supplement all new experiments with surveys before and after on behavioural issues, speci…cally in order to gain more insight into the behavioural nature of such e¤ects. working weeks). We assume further that the wage is equal to the marginal cost of production, such that all the gain from increased production accrue to the workers. 17 We assume that there will be no future e¤ects of the programme beyond the two years time horizon. Any additional accumulation of employment gains will therefore tend to improve on the result. Finally, we ignore any general equilibrium e¤ects that might be present Table 4 . 17 Note that we do not perform separate calculations for males and females in order to save space. Value of increased production -1198
Net result of CBA (in e) -1616 Table 4 shows that individual meetings with caseworkers are not only the most e¤ective instrument in terms of increasing employment, they also lead to the largest net gains to society. The net gain per new unemployment spell is around EUR 4725, and even the isolated cost calculation for the public sector shows net savings (the 2 nd column of Table 4 ).
Group meetings -although their impact was more modest -also give a surplus in the cost-bene…t analysis, since the costs of running these meetings are fairly low. The same is true for early activation, where the positive e¤ects found for men were su¢ cient to outweigh the slightly negative e¤ects for women and the costs of running the programmes. For the (imperfectly conducted) experiment with group meetings as well as early activation, the cost-bene…t analysis reveals a de…cit of about EUR 1600 per unemployment spell.
As mentioned in the literature review, these results are likely to change in the presence of general equilibrium e¤ects from the programmes. General equilibrium e¤ects could potentially improve as well as worsen the cost-bene…t calculation, although Gautier et al.
(2012) indicate that overall gain becomes smaller but does not disappear, when general equilibrium considerations are included, at least for the experimental design in QBW1.
On the other hand, e¤ects lasting beyond the two-year observation period will increase the gains of treatment and thereby increase the pro…tability of the programmes.
Conclusion
We The evidence we present is quite compelling; fortnightly individual meetings between newly unemployed workers and caseworkers can increase employment rates over the next two years by 10%, corresponding to 5 weeks, and our cost-bene…t analysis shows that the surplus per new unemployment spell is around EUR 4725. We …nd it remarkable that having to attend 6-7 meetings during the …rst 13 weeks of the unemployment spell can have such a large e¤ect on subsequent employment rates. Nevertheless, the positive e¤ect of individual meetings for newly unemployed workers is highly consistent with the results found in the literature on the e¤ects of meetings between caseworkers and unem-ployed workers. The policy advice is obvious; increasing the frequency of meetings with caseworkers is strongly recommendable.
The accumulated e¤ect of meetings is large for both men and women, but it starts materializing much earlier for women than for men. A multi-state duration analysis suggests that the explanation is that women …nd jobs faster, while men keep them longer, as a result of these meetings. A couple of potential explanations for these di¤erences by gender are that most caseworkers are female, and unemployed women may receive better job search assistance from them than men (cf. Behncke et al., 2010b), women and men work in di¤erent labour markets, with men being more likely to work in the private sector and women in the public sector. Again, female caseworkers may have better knowledge of public-sector vacancies than they have of vacancies in the private sector. 18 Unfortunately we have no information at present allowing us to test these hypotheses.
In the experiment involving group meetings we see a similar gender pattern but the e¤ects are more modest, leading to about 2 extra weeks of employment over a two-year period. We therefore conclude that one cannot achieve the same remarkable employment results using group meetings instead of individual meetings.
The positive and economically attractive results found in relation to meetings have also implied that a new wave of experiments will start in 2013. They will explore di¤erent aspects w.r.t. to meetings and try to explore the quality-quantity trade-o¤ using a crosscutting design to investigate the e¤ects of increasing meeting intensity versus the quality of the meetings, or both.
Early activation also shows positive e¤ects for men, especially young men, and especially during the more favourable cyclical conditions, while for women there was actually a negative e¤ect of early activation due to lock-in e¤ects. The e¤ect comes from a threat e¤ect (ex ante e¤ect) and more stable subsequent employment. This evidence on threat e¤ects of early activation for men but not for women corresponds well to results found by Rosholm & Svarer (2008) , who found such threat e¤ects for men but not for women. A couple of potential explanations for these di¤erences are that 18 An additional explanation suggested by a group of female caseworkers when these results were presented for them was that men tend to be more con…dent/proud/stubborn, and that advice therefore takes longer to 'sink in'.
unemployed men work in the untaxed sector, and therefore when facing mandatory activation, they prefer ordinary employment men dislike activation for other reasons, while women value the social network provided.
Again, we have no additional information allowing us to test these di¤erent hypotheses, but the behavioural gender di¤erences documented here certainly warrant further future research on these experiments and on the di¤erential impact of active labour market policies on men and women.
Finally, it should be mentioned that the present study does not in any way take into account general equilibrium e¤ects or substitution e¤ects arising from the experiment. the actual policy implemented. It might very well be the case that meetings lead to more positive e¤ects if they improve the match between workers and …rms and this way improve the pro…tability of a vacancy. It could also be the case that the general equilibrium e¤ects di¤er between whether the stated intention of the meetings is counseling or monitoringlikely favouring the former. This is also left for future study.
We believe that the results obtained in this paper shed some light on the reason for the Danish success in having obtained a low structural unemployment rate prior to the recent global economic crisis. Before the crisis the structural unemployment rate was estimated to be around 3.5% as compared to 9-9.5% in 1993. Since then, active labour market policies have been introduced and continuously tightened during the 1990s and early 2000s. Especially, meeting intensities have increased, early activation has been introduced (mandatory activation was pushed forward from 4 years to 9 months of unemployment during this period), and noncompliance with the rules has led to sanctions. Moreover, we believe that the results point to possible improvements of the policy conducted, with even more focus on early individual meetings, which are much cheaper than full-time programme participation. The fact that the threat e¤ect of early programme participation disappears during a cyclical downturn may warrant further analysis of optimal cyclical labour market policies.
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Part I Appendix: 
